We develop a model of investment with …nancial constraints and use it to investigate the relation between investment and Tobin's q. A …rm is …nanced partly by insiders, who control its assets, and partly by outside investors. When their wealth is scarce, insiders earn a rate of return higher than the market rate of return, i.e., they receive a quasi-rent on invested capital. This rent is priced into the value of the …rm, so Tobin's q is driven by two forces: changes in the value of invested capital, and changes in the value of the insiders' future rents per unit of capital. This weakens the correlation between q and investment, relative to the frictionless benchmark. We present a calibrated version of the model, which, due to this e¤ect, generates realistic correlations between investment, q, and cash ‡ow.
Introduction
The standard model of investment with convex adjustment costs predicts that movements in the investment rate should be entirely explained by changes in Tobin's q. This prediction has generally been rejected in empirical studies, which show that cash ‡ow and other measures of current pro…tability have a strong predictive power for investment, after controlling for q.
These results have been interpreted as evidence of …nancial frictions which make investment more sensitive to internal sources of …nance, for which cash- ‡ow is a natural proxy, than to expected pro…tability, captured by q. Starting with Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) , this interpretation has been pursued and developed by a vast empirical literature. 1 At the same time, a literature which goes back to Bernanke and Gertler (1989) , Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) , Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) , and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000) , has developed models of investment with …nancial constraints which are incorporated into full dynamic general equilibrium models and used to study the aggregate implications of …nancial frictions. 2 These models capture the …nancial constraint by focusing on some basic informational or enforcement friction which a¤ects the agents who run the …rms in the economy. In this paper, we study the implications of a model of this type for the q theory of investment. That is, we ask whether a simple microfounded model of …nancial frictions can deliver realistic correlations between investment, q, and cash- ‡ow. This exercise provides a basic test of consistency for this class of models.
We start from a setup with …rms controlled by "insiders," who can be interpreted as the entrepreneur, the manager, or the controlling shareholder. We assume that the insider has the ability to partially divert the assets of the …rm and, if he does so, he is punished by losing control of the …rm. In this setup, we characterize the optimal long-term …nancial contract between the insider and the outside investors.
Aside from the enforcement friction, our model is virtually identical to the classic Hayashi (1982) model. In particular, it features convex adjustment costs and constant returns to scale. This allows us to identify in a clean way the e¤ect of the …nancial friction on the equilibrium behavior of investment and q. As in Hayashi (1982) , we make a distinction between marginal q, which captures the marginal value of new investment, and average q, which is the ratio of the total value of the …rm to the replacement value of its capital stock. Average q is observable and, thus, is the notion of q typically used in empirical studies.
On the analytical side, we show that the …nancial constraint introduces a positive wedge between marginal q and average q. The wedge between average and marginal q re ‡ects the tension between the future pro…tability of investment and the availability of internal funds in the short run. On the quantitative side, we use a calibrated version of the model to 1 show that this wedge varies over time, breaking the one-to-one correspondence between investment and average q which holds in the frictionless model. We then simulate the model and run standard investment regressions on the simulated data. From this exercise we obtain coe¢ cients on q and cash ‡ow which are in line with those found in empirical regressions. We conclude that our simple model is able to replicate the basic correlation patterns between investment, asset prices, and cash- ‡ow.
To assess the role of the …nancial friction, we compare the quantitative implications of our model with those of the frictionless benchmark. In the frictionless benchmark, the coe¢ cient on q in the investment regression is equal to the inverse of the coe¢ cient on the quadratic term in the adjustment cost function. The presence of the …nancial friction (2007) look more closely at the implications of the theory for asset pricing. In particular, they …nd a set of securities that implements the optimal contract and then study the stochastic behavior of the prices of these securities. Here, our objective is to examine the model's implication for q theory, therefore we simply focus on the total value of the …rm, which includes the value of all the claims held by insiders and outsiders. A distinctive feature of our approach is that we make heavy use of the assumption of constant returns to scale, so that optimal contracts take a simple linear form. This makes aggregation straightforward and makes our model very easy to incorporate into a general equilibrium environment. In this sense, the model retains the simplicity of a representative agent model, while allowing for rich dynamics of net worth, pro…ts and investment.
The idea of looking at the statistical implications of a simulated model to understand the empirical correlation between investment and q goes back to Sargent (1980) . Recently, Gomes (2001) , Ejarque (2001, 2003) and Eberly (2004, 2005) have followed this route, introducing both …nancial frictions and decreasing returns and market power to match the existing empirical evidence. 3 The conclusion one can derive from this set of papers is that decreasing returns and market power help to generate realistic correlations, while …nancial frictions do not. In particular, Gomes (2001) and Cooper and Ejarque (2003) obtain negative results which stand in contrast to the results obtained here. In their simulated economies with …nancial frictions Tobin's q still explains most of the variability in investment, and cash ‡ow does not provide any additional explanatory power. 4 The main di¤erence between our approach and their approach is the modeling of the …nancial constraint. They introduce a constraint on the ‡ow of outside …nance that can be issued each period. Here instead, we explicitly model a contractual imperfection and solve for the optimal long-term contract. This adds a state variable to the problem, namely the stock of existing liabilities of the …rm, thus generating slow-moving dynamics in the gap between internal funds and the desired level of investment. These dynamics account for the empirical disconnect between investment and q and explain why our model of …nancial frictions is better able to replicate observed correlations. On the other hand, there are some parallels between our approach and the approach based on decreasing returns and market power, in particular with the "growth options" mechanism emphasized in Abel and Eberly (2005) . Both approaches imply that movements in q can re ‡ect changes in future rents that are unrelated to current investment. In our paper these rents are not due to market power, but to the scarcity of entrepreneurial wealth, which evolves endogenously.
Following Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) there has been a large empirical literature exploring the relation between investment and q using …rm level data. The majority of these papers …nd small coe¢ cients on q and positive and signi…cant coe¢ cients on cash ‡ow and other variables describing the current …nancial condition of a …rm. This result has been ascribed to measurement error in q, possibly caused by non-fundamental stock market movements. 5 Measurement error would reduce the explanatory power of q, and cash ‡ow would then appear as signi…cant, given that it is a good predictor of future pro…ts. Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) show that this is insu¢ cient to explain the failure of q theory in investment regressions. 6 They replace the value of q obtained by …nancial market prices with a measure of "fundamental q"(which employs current cash ‡ow as a predictor of future pro…ts), and they show that current cash ‡ow retains its independent explanatory power.
Finally, Hennessy and Whited (2007) build a rich structural model of …rms'investment with …nancial frictions, which is then estimated by simulated method of moments on …rm-level data. They …nd that the …nancial constraint plays an important role in explaining observed …rms' behavior. 7 The evidence in this literature provides the starting motivation for our exercise. In an extension of the model (Section 4) we introduce …rm-level heterogeneity and further explore the connection between our model and panel data evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, the derivation of the 4 See also Moyen (2004) . 5 The debate is open whether non-fundamental movements in q should a¤ect investment or not. See Chirinko and Schaller (2001) 7 In their model, due to the complexity of the estimation task, the …nancial friction is introduced in a relatively "reduced form," by assuming that there are some transaction costs associated to the issuance of new equity or new debt, as in Cooper and Ejarque (2003) and Gomes (2001) . The di¤erence in results, relative to these papers, appears due to the fact that Hennessy and Whited (2007) also match the behavior of a number of …nancial variables. optimal contract, and the equilibrium analysis. Section 3 contains the calibration and simulation results. In Section 4 we extend the model to allow for …rm-level heterogeneity. Section 5 concludes. All proofs not in the text are in the appendix.
The Model

The environment
Consider an economy populated by two groups of agents of equal mass, consumers and entrepreneurs. Consumers are in…nitely lived and have a …xed endowment of labor l C , which they supply inelastically on the labor market at the wage w t . Consumers are risk neutral and have a discount factor C . Entrepreneurs have …nite lives, with a constant probability of death . Each period, a fraction of entrepreneurs is replaced by an equal mass of newly born entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs begin life with no capital and have a labor endowment l E in the …rst period of life, which gives them an initial wealth w t l E . Entrepreneurs are also risk neutral, with a discount factor E < C . The last assumption, together with the assumption of …nitely lived entrepreneurs, is needed to ensure the existence of a steady state with a binding …nancial constraint. We normalize total labor supply to one, that is,
Starting in their second period of life, entrepreneurs have access to the constant-returnsto-scale technology A t F (k t ; l t ), where k t is the stock of capital installed in period t 1, and l t is labor hired on the labor market. The productivity A t is equal across entrepreneurs and follows the stationary stochastic process A t = (A t 1 ; t ), where t is an i.i.d. shock drawn from the discrete p.d.f. ( t ). We normalize the unconditional mean of A t to 1.
Investment in new capital is subject to convex adjustment costs, which we now describe.
At the end of each period, after production has taken place, capital depreciates and the entrepreneur has access to k t units of used capital. Then, he can trade capital on the used capital market, at the price q o t , and choose to hold on to k o t units of used capital, where k o t may be di¤erent from k t . Next, the entrepreneur chooses the capital stock for next period k t+1 , and pays G (k t+1 ; k o t ), which includes both the cost of acquiring new capital and the installation (or uninstallation) costs. The function G (k t+1 ; k o t ) is increasing and convex in k t+1 , decreasing in k o t , homogeneous of degree one, and satis…es
t . An entrepreneur born at date t 0 …nances his current and future investment by issuing a long-term …nancial contract, specifying a sequence of state-contingent transfers (which can be positive or negative) from the entrepreneur to the outside investors, fd t g 1 t=t 0
. In period t = t 0 , his budget constraint is
The entrepreneur uses his initial wealth to consume and to acquire used capital and transform it into capital ready for use in t 0 + 1. Furthermore, he can increase his consumption and investment by borrowing from consumers, i.e., choosing a negative value for d t 0 . In the remaining periods, the budget constraint is
He uses current revenues, net of labor costs and …nancial payments, to …nance consumption and investment. At the beginning of each period t, the entrepreneur learns whether that is his last period of activity. Therefore, in the last period, he liquidates all the capital k t and consumes the receipts, setting
From then on, the payments d t are set to zero.
Financial contracts are subject to limited enforcement. The entrepreneur controls the …rm's assets k t and can, in each period, run away, diverting a fraction (1 ) of them. If he does so, he re-enters the …nancial market as if he was a young entrepreneur, with initial wealth given by the value of the diverted assets, and zero liabilities. That is, the only punishment for a defaulting entrepreneur is the loss of a fraction of the …rm's assets. 8 Aside from limited enforcement no other imperfections are present, in particular, …nancial contracts are allowed to be fully state-contingent.
Recursive competitive equilibrium
We will focus our attention on recursive equilibria where the economy's dynamics are fully characterized by the vector of aggregate state variables X t (A t ; K t ; B t ), where K t is the aggregate capital stock and B t denotes the aggregate liabilities of the entrepreneurs, to be de…ned in a moment. In the equilibria considered, consumers always have positive consumption. Therefore, the market discount factor is equal to their discount factor, C , and the net present value of the liabilities of an individual entrepreneur can be written as
The variable B t is equal to the economy-wide aggregate of these liabilities.
A recursive competitive equilibrium is de…ned by law of motions for the endogenous state variables:
and by two maps, w (X t ) and q o (X t ), which give the market prices as a function of the current state. Given these four objects, we can derive the optimal individual behavior of the entrepreneurs. The quadruple K; B; w (:) and q o (:) forms a recursive competitive equilibrium if: (i) the entrepreneurs'optimal behavior is consistent with the law of motions K and B, and (ii) the labor and used capital market clear. In the next two subsections, we …rst characterize entrepreneurs' decisions, and then aggregate and check market clearing.
We use
to denote in a compact way the law of motion for X t derived from the laws of motion ; K, and B.
Optimal …nancial contracts
Let us consider …rst the optimization problem of the individual entrepreneur. Exploiting the assumption of constant returns to scale, we will show that the individual problem is linear. This property will greatly simplify aggregation.
We describe the problem in recursive form, dropping time subscripts. Consider a continuing entrepreneur, in state X, who controls a …rm with capital k and outstanding liabilities b.
Let V (k; b; X) denote his end-of-period expected utility, computed after production takes place and assuming that the entrepreneur chooses not to default in the current period. The entrepreneur takes as given the law of motion for the aggregate state X and the pricing functions w (X) and q o (X).
The budget constraint takes the form
Lemma 1 allows us to rewrite it as
where q m (X) is the shadow price of the new capital k 0 , and R (X) is the (gross) return per unit of capital, on the installed capital k.
Lemma 1 Given the prices w (X) and q o (X), there are two functions q m (X) and R (X) that satisfy the following conditions for any k 0 and k,
This lemma exploits the assumption of constant returns to show that q m (X) and R (X)
are independent of the current and future capital stocks, k and k 0 , and only depend on the prices w (X) and q o (X). The variable q m (X) is equal to marginal q in our model, and will be discussed in detail below.
A continuing entrepreneur can satisfy his existing liabilities b either by repaying now or by promising future repayments. Let b 0 ( 0 ) denote next-period liabilities, contingent on the realization of the aggregate shock 0 , if tomorrow is not a terminal date, and let b 0 L ( 0 ) denote the same, in the event of termination. Then, the entrepreneur faces the constraint
where the expectation is taken with respect to 0 .
The entrepreneur has to ensure that his future promised repayments are credible. Recall that, if the entrepreneur defaults, his liabilities are set to zero and he has access to a fraction (1 ) of the capital. Therefore, if tomorrow is a continuation date, his promised repayments b 0 ( 0 ) have to satisfy the no-default condition
for all 0 . Throughout this section, X 0 stands for H (X; 0 ). If tomorrow is the …nal period, the entrepreneur can either liquidate his …rm, getting R (X 0 ) k 0 , and repay his liabilities, or default and get (1 ) R (X 0 ) k 0 . Therefore, the no-default condition in the …nal period takes the form
which again needs to hold for all 0 .
We are now ready to write the Bellman equation for the entrepreneur: 
for some positive, state-contingent function (X). Then, the no-default condition (3) becomes linear as well, and can be rewritten as
This is a form of "collateral constraint,"which implies that an entrepreneur can only pledge a fraction of the future gross returns R (X 0 ) k. 9 The crucial di¤erence with similar constraints in the literature (e.g., in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) ), is the fact that we allow for fully state-contingent securities.
Before stating Proposition 3, we impose some restrictions on the equilibrium prices w (:) and q o (:) and on the law of motion H. These conditions ensure that the entrepreneur's problem is well de…ned and deliver a simple optimal contract where the collateral constraint (3') is always binding. In subsection 2.4 we will verify that these conditions are met in equilibrium.
Suppose the law of motion H admits an ergodic distribution for the aggregate state X, with support X. Assume that equilibrium prices are such that the following inequalities hold for each X 2 X:
and
Condition (6) implies that the expected rate of return on capital E [R (X 0 )] =q m (X) is greater than the inverse discount factor of the entrepreneur, so a continuing entrepreneur prefers investment to consumption. Condition (7) implies that "pledgeable"returns are insu¢ cient to …nance the purchase of one unit of capital, i.e., investment cannot be fully …nanced with outside funds. This condition ensures that investment is …nite. Finally, condition (8) ensures that the entrepreneur's utility is bounded.
Before introducing one last condition, we need to de…ne a function , which summarizes information about current and future prices. 8 that satis…es the following recursive de…nition
This function satis…es (X) > 1 for all X 2 X.
A further condition on equilibrium prices is then:
for all X 2 X and all X 0 = H (X; 0 ). Condition (10) ensures that entrepreneurs never delay investment. Namely, it implies that they always prefer to invest in physical capital today rather than buying a state-contingent security that pays in some future state.
The function de…ned in Lemma 2 will play a central role in the rest of the analysis.
The next proposition shows that substituting (X) on the right-hand side of (5), gives us the value function for the entrepreneur (justifying our slight abuse of notation). De…ne the net worth of the entrepreneur
which represents the di¤erence between the liquidation value of the …rm and the value of its liabilities. Equation (5) implies that expected utility is a linear function of net worth and (X) represents the marginal value of entrepreneurial net worth. We will go back to its interpretation in subsection 2.5.
Proposition 3 Suppose the aggregate law of motion H and the equilibrium prices w (:) and q o (:) are such that (6)- (8) and (10) hold, where (:) is de…ned as in Lemma 2. Then, the value function V (k; b; X) takes the form (5) and the entrepreneur's optimal policy is c E = 0;
The entrepreneur's problem can be analyzed under weaker versions of conditions (6)- (8) and (10) . However, as we shall see in a moment, these conditions are appropriate for studying small stochastic ‡uctuations around a steady state where the …nancial constraint is binding. 9
Aggregation
Having characterized optimal individual behavior, we now aggregate and impose market clearing on the labor market and on the used capital market. To help the reading of the dynamics, we now revert to using time subscripts.
Each period, a fraction of entrepreneurs begins life with zero capital and labor income w t l E . Their net worth is simply equal to their labor income. Moreover, a fraction (1 ) of continuing entrepreneurs has net worth equal to n t = R t k t b t . The aggregate net worth of the entrepreneurial sector, excluding entrepreneurs in the last period of activity, is then given by
Using the optimal individual rules (11) and (12), we get the following dynamics for the aggregate states K t and B t
Finally, the following conditions ensure that the prices w t and q o t are consistent with market clearing in the labor market and in the used capital market
To clarify the role of condition (16) , notice that all continuing entrepreneurs choose the same ratio k o t =k t+1 , and this ratio must satisfy the …rst-order condition q o t +@G (k t+1 ; k o t ) =@k o t = 0. Market clearing on the used capital market requires that continuing entrepreneurs acquire all the existing used capital stock, so K t =K t+1 is equal to k o t =k t+1 . This gives us condition (16) . Summing up, we have found a recursive equilibrium if the laws of motion K and B and the pricing rules for w t and q o t satisfy (13) to (16), and if they are such that conditions (6)- (10) are satis…ed. The next proposition shows that an equilibrium with these properties exists under some parametric assumptions. Let the production function and the adjustment cost function be:
To construct a recursive equilibrium, we consider a deterministic version of the same economy (i.e., an economy where A t is constant and equal to 1), and use the deterministic steady state as a reference point. Let A; A be the support of A t in the stochastic economy.
Proposition 4
Consider an economy with Cobb-Douglas technology and quadratic adjustment costs. Consider the steady-state equilibrium of the corresponding deterministic economy and suppose that it satis…es the following two properties: (i) the …nancial constraint is binding at the steady state ( R SS > 1), (ii) the steady state is locally saddle-path stable.
Then there is a scalar > 0 such that, if A A < , there exists a recursive competitive equilibrium of the stochastic economy with aggregate dynamics described by (13)- (14) .
In the appendix we spell out conditions on the economy's underlying parameters which ensure that the deterministic steady state satis…es conditions (i) and (ii) in the hypothesis of this proposition. 10 These parametric restrictions are satis…ed in all the calibrations considered below.
Finally, as a useful benchmark, let us brie ‡y characterize the frictionless equilibrium which arises when = 1. In the frictionless benchmark, equilibrium dynamics are fully characterized by the condition
The de…nitions of q m t and R t are the same as those given in the constrained economy, and so are the equilibrium conditions (15) and (16) for w t and q o t . Given that E < C entrepreneurs consume their wealth w t l E in the …rst period of their life and consume zero in all future periods. Investment is entirely …nanced by consumers, which explains why the consumers'discount factor appears in the equilibrium condition (19).
Average q and marginal q
Having characterized equilibrium dynamics, we can now derive the appropriate expressions for average q and for marginal q. Marginal q is immediately derived from the entrepreneur's problem as the shadow value of new capital, q m t . The de…nition of q m t in Lemma 1 and the equilibrium condition (16) can be used to obtain
This is the standard result in economies with convex adjustment costs: there is a one-to-one relation between the investment rate and the shadow price of new capital.
To derive average q, we …rst need to obtain the …nancial value of a representative …rm, that is, the sum of the value of all the claims on the …rm's future earnings, held by insiders (entrepreneurs) and outsiders (consumers). For …rms in the last period of activity this value is zero. For continuing …rms, this gives us the expression
We subtract the current payments to outsiders, d t , to obtain the end-of-period value of the …rm. Recall that continuing entrepreneurs receive zero payments in the optimal contract (except in the …nal date), so there is no need to subtract current payments to insiders.
Dividing the …nancial value of the …rm by the total capital invested we obtain average q
Notice we divide by k t+1 because we are evaluating q t at the end of the period, after the capital k t+1 has been installed. This is consistent with the fact that the value of the …rm, p t , is also evaluated at the end of the period. In the recursive equilibrium described above, q t is the same for all continuing …rms. For liquidating …rms both p t and k t+1 are zero, so q t is not de…ned for those …rms.
The next proposition shows that the …nancial constraint introduces a wedge between marginal q and average q, and that the wedge is determined by t , the marginal value of entrepreneurial wealth.
Proposition 5 In the recursive equilibrium described in Proposition 4, average q is the same for all continuing …rms and is greater than marginal q, q t > q m t . Everything else equal, the ratio q t =q m t is increasing in t .
Proof. Substituting the value function in the value of the …rm (20) , and rearranging gives
Using the entrepreneur's budget constraint, constant returns to scale for G, and the equilibrium properties of q o t and q m t , gives
Substituting in (21) and rearranging gives
Notice that (11) implies that (R t k t b t ) =k t+1 is equal across continuing …rms. Given that t > 1 and b t R t k t < R t k t the stated results follow from this expression.
Notice that in the frictionless benchmark investment is fully …nanced by consumers and we have b t = R t k t , which immediately implies q t = q m t . In this case, the model boils down to the Hayashi (1982) model: average q is identical to marginal q and is a su¢ cient statistic for investment.
It is useful to provide some explanation for the wedge between average q and marginal q in the constrained economy. First, notice that this wedge is not due to the di¤erence in the discount factors of entrepreneurs and consumers. In fact, if we evaluated the expected present value of the entrepreneur's payo¤s fc E t+j g using the discount factor C instead of E , we would get a quantity greater than V (k t ; b t ; X t ) and the measured wedge would be larger. 11 The fundamental reason why the wedge is positive is that t > 1, the marginal value of entrepreneurial wealth is larger than one. If t was equal to 1, then the …rst term on the right-hand side of (22) would be zero and the wedge would disappear.
To
which is greater than one, by condition (6). In short, the value of a unit of installed capital is larger inside the …rm than outside the …rm, and this explains why q theory does not hold.
This discrepancy does not open an arbitrage opportunity, because the agents that can take advantage of this opportunity (the entrepreneurs) are against a …nancial constraint. This thought experiment captures the basic intuition behind Proposition 5.
To go one step further, notice that the entrepreneur can do better than following the strategy described above. In particular, he can use borrowed funds on top of his own funds, and he can re-invest the revenues made at t + 1, rather than consume. The ability of borrowing allows the entrepreneur to earn an expected leveraged return, between t and t+1, equal to 12
For the quantitative results presented in Section 3, we also experimented with this alternative de…nition of q (discounting the entrepreneur's claims at the rate C instead of E ), with minimal e¤ects on the results. 1 2 Notice that, from (11), 1== (q
) is the capital stock kt+1 which can be invested by an entrepreneur with one dollar of wealth. In t + 1 the entrepreneur has to repay Rt+1kt+1 and can keep (1 ) Rt+1kt+1. To prove the inequality, rearrange it and simplify to obtain
The inequality follows from (a) and C > E . 13 
Quantitative Implications
In this section, we examine the quantitative implications of the model looking at the joint behavior of investment, Tobin's q, and cash ‡ow in a simulated economy. First, we give a basic quantitative characterization of the economy's response to a productivity shock.
Second, we ask whether the wedge between marginal q and average q in our model helps to explain the empirical failure of q theory in investment regressions.
Baseline calibration
The production function is Cobb-Douglas and adjustment costs are quadratic, as speci…ed in (17) and (18) . The productivity process is given by A t = e at , where a t follows the autoregressive process
with t a Gaussian, i. where CF K denotes cash ‡ow per unit of capital invested, IK denotes the investment rate, r (:) denotes the (yearly) coe¢ cient of serial correlation, and (:) the standard devia- 1 3 The theoretical analysis can be extended to the case where t is a continuous variable. To ensure that At is bounded, we set At = A whenever e a t < A and At = A whenever e a t > A. As long as 2 is small the bounds A and A are immaterial for the results. 1 4 We use the same data from Compustat as Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) . The sample consists of 428 U.S. stock market listed …rms from 1978 to 1989. We use the code of João Ejarque to calculate …rm-speci…c statistics separately for each variable. The moments reported in this paper are the means across all …rms. Any ratio used (e.g. (IK) = (CF K)) is a ratio of such means. tion. We calibrate so that our simulated series replicate the autocorrelation of cash ‡ow r (CF K) = 0:51. In our baseline calibration this gives us = 0:75. We set to match the ratio between cash ‡ow volatility and investment volatility, (IK) = (CF K) = 0:48.
Given all the other parameters, this gives us = 8:5.
Finally, the parameters ; ; and l E are chosen as follows. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) report that 30% of manufacturing investment is …nanced externally. Based on this, we choose = 0:3. The parameters and l E are chosen to obtain an outside …nance premium of 2%, as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (2000) . We experimented with di¤erent values of and l E and found that, as long as the …nance premium remains at 2%, the speci…c choice of these two parameters has minimal e¤ects on our results.
Impulse responses
In the model, the net investment rate of the representative …rm is
and the ratio of cash ‡ow to the …rm's capital stock is Figure 1 plots the responses of IK t , q t , and CF K t , following a positive technology shock.
All variables are expressed in terms of deviations from their steady-state values.
All three variables in Figure 1 increase on impact, as in the standard model without …nancial frictions. However, the dynamics of average q are now jointly determined by marginal q and by the wedge q t =q m t . Marginal q moves one for one with investment. Average q initially rises with investment, but at some point (3 periods after the shock) it falls below its steady-state value, while investment continues to be above the steady state for several more periods (up to period 6 periods after the shock). As marginal q is reverting towards its steady state the wedge remains large, thus pushing average q below the steady state. The slow-moving dynamics of the wedge are responsible for breaking the synchronicity between average q and investment.
In Proposition 5, we argued that the ratio of average q to marginal q is positively related to t , the marginal value of entrepreneurial net worth. The top panel of Figure 2 plots the response of t to the same technology shock, showing that t decreases on impact following the shock, and then slowly reverts to its steady-state value. The slow adjustment in the wedge is closely related to the slow adjustment of t .
To understand the response of t , recall from the discussion in subsection 2.5 that the dynamics of t are closely related to those of the rate of return E t [R t+1 ] =q m t , since t is a forward-looking measure which cumulates the discounted returns on entrepreneurial At the same time, entrepreneurs'net worth increases because of the current increase in cash ‡ow. This leads to an increase in K t+1 , which reduces R t+1 , due to decreasing returns to capital, and increases q m t , due to adjustment costs. These e¤ects tend to reduce the marginal value of entrepreneurial wealth. In the case considered, the second channel dominates and the net e¤ect is a reduction in E t [R t+1 ] =q m t and in t . As we will see in subsection 3.5, this result depends of the type of shock considered, and can be reversed if we consider shocks with greater persistence. For now, what matters is that the dynamic response of t breaks the one-to-one correspondence between IK t and q t .
Investment regressions
We now turn to investment regressions, and ask whether our model can replicate the coe¢ -cients on q and cash ‡ow observed in the data. To do so, we generate simulated time series from our calibrated model and run the standard investment regression
The regression coe¢ cients for the simulated model are presented in the …rst row of Table   2 . As reference points, we report the coe¢ cients that arise in the model without …nancial frictions ( = 1) and the empirical coe¢ cients obtained by Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) .
The latter are representative of the orders of magnitude obtained in empirical studies.
Absent …nancial frictions, q is a su¢ cient statistic for investment, so the model gives a coe¢ cient on cash ‡ow equal to zero. In this case, the coe¢ cient on q is equal to 1= , which, given the calibration above is equal to 0.118, a value substantially higher than those obtained in empirical regressions. Adding …nancial frictions helps both to obtain a positive coe¢ cient on cash ‡ow and a smaller coe¢ cient on q. The impulse response functions reported in Figure 1 help us to understand why. Financial frictions weaken the relation between i t and q t , while investment and cash ‡ow remain closely related, due to the e¤ect of cash ‡ow on entrepreneurial net worth. Notice that under the simple AR1 structure for productivity used here, a sizeable correlation between q and investment is still present. Running a simple univariate regression of investment on q gives a coe¢ cient of 0:13, not too far from the frictionless coe¢ cient, and an R 2 of 0:5. This is not surprising, given that only one shock is present. However, once cash ‡ow is added to the independent variables, the explanatory power of q falls dramatically. To see this, notice that the R 2 of the bivariate regression is virtually 1, while the R 2 of a univariate regression of investment on cash ‡ow alone is 0:995. So the additional explanatory power of q is less than 1 percent of investment volatility.
The values of R 2 just reported are clearly unrealistic and are a product of the simple one-shock structure used. Furthermore, idiosyncratic uncertainty and measurement error are absent from the exercise. For these reasons, we do not attempt to exactly replicate the empirical coe¢ cients for q and cash ‡ow. 16 Instead, our point here is that a reasonable calibration of the model can help generate realistic coe¢ cients for both q and cash ‡ow, by introducing a time-varying wedge between marginal q and average q. An extension of the model that allows for idiosyncratic uncertainty is discussed below.
Sensitivity
To verify the robustness of our result, we experiment with di¤erent parameter con…gura-tions, in a neighborhood of the parameters introduced above. Table 3 shows the coe¢ cients of the investment regression for a sample of these alternative speci…cations. Note that our basic result holds under a large set of possible parameterizations. Moreover, a number of interesting comparative statics patterns emerge. Table 3 . Sensitivity analysis.
First, notice that increasing brings the economy closer to the frictionless benchmark and reduces the wedge between marginal q and average q. This accounts for the increase in the coe¢ cient on q and the decrease of the coe¢ cient on cash ‡ow when we increase . However, this comparative static result does not apply to all parameter changes that bring the economy closer to the frictionless benchmark. In particular, notice that when we increase l E (which determines the initial wealth of the entrepreneurs) both the coe¢ cient on q and the coe¢ cient on cash ‡ow increase. 17 This is consistent with the general point raised by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), who note that the coe¢ cient on cash ‡ow in investment regressions is not necessarily a good measure of how tight the …nancial constraint is.
Increasing reduces the response of investment to the productivity shock and decreases the coe¢ cients of both q and cash ‡ow. Finally, an increase in the persistence of the technology shock, , tends to lower the coe¢ cient on q and to increase the coe¢ cient on cash ‡ow. The e¤ect of changing is analyzed in detail in the following subsection.
Current and future changes in productivity
To further clarify what determines the wedge between marginal and average q, it is useful to compare the e¤ect of shocks with di¤erent persistence. Figure 3 plots the impulseresponse functions of average q and marginal q for two di¤erent values of the autocorrelation coe¢ cient, . They can be compared to the middle panel in Figure 1 .
In panel (a) of Figure 3 we plot the e¤ect of a very persistent shock ( = 0:98). In this case, the e¤ect of the shock on future returns dominates the e¤ect on current cash ‡ow.
Entrepreneurial investment becomes very pro…table while entrepreneurs'internal funds are 1 7 A similar result emerges if we decrease . only catching up gradually. The wedge increases in the short-run, re ‡ecting the fact that the …nancial constraint is initially tighter. In panel (b) we plot the e¤ect of a temporary shock ( = 0). This shock has the opposite e¤ect on the wedge on impact: internal funds are higher, while future total factor productivity is unchanged. As investment increases, the equilibrium rate of return E t [R t+1 ] =q m t falls due to decreasing returns to capital and convex adjustment costs. The wedge falls, and this e¤ect is so strong that average q and marginal q move in opposite directions. Marginal q increases, due to the increase in investment, while average q falls re ‡ecting the lowered expected pro…tability of entrepreneurial investment.
The two plots in Figure 3 show that the wedge between marginal and average q captures the tension between the future pro…tability of investment and the current availability of funds to the entrepreneur. They also suggest that the observed volatility of q depends on the types of shocks hitting the economy. In Table 4 we report the ratio of the volatility of q to the volatility of the investment rate, (q) = (IK), for di¤erent values of . For comparison, the value of the ratio (q) = (IK) for Compustat …rms is equal to 27. 18 In the frictionless benchmark, the ratio between asset price volatility and investment volatility is equal to , which we are keeping constant at 8:5. For values of lower than 0:89 the presence of the …nancial friction tends to dampen asset price volatility. However, for higher values of , asset price volatility is ampli…ed. For example, when = 0:98 the volatility of q doubles compared to frictionless case, although it is still smaller than in the data. Highly persistent shocks to productivity help to obtain more volatile asset prices, Table 4 . Shock persistence and the volatility of q.
In Table 4 we also report the e¤ects of di¤erent values of on the volatility of in-
. High values of tend to increase the volatility of investment relative to the volatility of cash ‡ow. When we increase we can re-calibrate to keep Table 4 ). Although the model does well on these dimensions, the required adjustment costs seems very high and this parametrization delivers an excessive degree of serial correlation for cash ‡ow. A relatively easy …x would be to introduce a combination of both temporary shocks and shocks to long-run productivity. This would allow the model to deliver less serial correlation, while at the same time having larger movements in q that are uncorrelated with current investment. Again, this extension is better developed in a model that allows for a richer set of shocks and is left to future work.
Firm-level Heterogeneity
So far, we have focused on an economy where all …rms have the same productivity, and only aggregate productivity shocks are present. This, together with the assumption of constant returns to scale, implies that the investment rate, q, and cash ‡ow (normalized by assets) are identical across …rms. The advantage of this approach is that it makes it easy to compare our results to the classic Hayashi (1982) model. At the same time, this approach has its limitations, given that the evidence on the relation between q and investment is largely based on panel data. Therefore, it is useful to consider variations of the model that allow for cross-sectional heterogeneity.
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An immediate extension is to allow for multiple sectors. If we assume that labor and capital are immobile across sectors, which may be a reasonable approximation in the short run, then w and q o are sector-speci…c prices and each sector's dynamics are analogous to the aggregate dynamics studied above. Therefore, under this interpretation, all the results presented so far apply to the multiple sector case. In this section, we pursue an alternative extension, by introducing productivity di¤erences across …rms. Let A j;t denote the productivity of …rm j. Newborn entrepreneurs receive an initial random draw A j;t from a given distribution . From then on, individual productivity follows the stationary process A j;t = (A j;t 1 ; j;t ) with j;t drawn from the discrete p.d.f. ( j;t ). To keep matters simple, we abstract from aggregate uncertainty and assume that the realized cross-sectional distribution of the shocks is always identical to the ex-ante distribution for each individual …rm. The details of this extension are presented in Appendix B.
Given the absence of aggregate uncertainty, aggregate capital is constant in this economy and so is the wage w and the price of used capital q o . This also implies that q m is constant and equal to 1. However, as long as the …nancial constraint is binding, average q is greater than 1 and is di¤erent across …rms. The assumption of constant returns to scale still helps to simplify the problem, as it implies that the investment rate, average q, and the cash‡ow-to-assets ratio are independent of the individual …rm's assets k j;t . However, these three variables are now functions of the …rm's productivity A j;t and are given by the following three equations,
1;
where the return per unit of capital, R j;t , and the marginal value of entrepreneurial wealth, j;t , are now …rm-speci…c variables. 19 The three expressions above for IK j;t , q j;t , and CF K j;t , emphasize once more the tension between current and future changes in productivity discussed in subsection 3.5. On the one hand, current returns, captured by R j;t , a¤ect positively both the investment rate and cash ‡ow, but have no e¤ect on q, which is a purely forward-looking variable. On the other hand, future returns, captured by E [R j;t+1 jA j;t ], a¤ect positively investment and q, but have no e¤ects on current cash ‡ows.
To study the implications of the model for investment regressions, we construct simulated time-series from the model described and run the investment regression (23) . In Table 5 we report the regression coe¢ cients obtained from the simulated series, using the same parameters as in Section 3.
Model with …nancial friction 0.116 1.023 Table 5 . Investment regression. Firm-speci…c shocks.
Once more, …nancial frictions introduce a strong correlation between cash ‡ow and investment, so that cash ‡ow has a positive coe¢ cient in the regression. Notice that both coe¢ cients a 1 and a 2 are now larger than in the corresponding line of Table 2 and larger than their empirical counterpart. This is not surprising, given that …rms now face essentially zero adjustment costs. In this model, adjustment costs are only due to aggregate changes in the capital stock, and with no aggregate uncertainty such changes are absent. 20 Another implication of the absence of adjustment costs is that investment is too volatile. The ratio (IK) = (CF K) is equal to 1.34 in the simulated series, more than twice as large as in the data. 21 In our model we have essentially assumed "external adjustment costs,"by allowing …rms to trade homogeneous capital on the used capital market. A fully developed model with …rm-speci…c shocks clearly calls for the introduction of "internal adjustment costs,"
both to reduce investment volatility at the …rm level and to obtain more realistic coe¢ -cients in investment regressions. However, with internal adjustment costs we lose analytical tractability, as optimal investment rules are, in general, non-linear.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed a tractable framework to study the e¤ect of …nancial frictions on the joint dynamics of investment and of the value of the …rm. The model shows that, in the presence of …nancial frictions, q re ‡ects future quasi-rents that will go to the insider. This introduces a wedge between average and marginal q. The size of this wedge is determined by the tension between current and future pro…tability. A …rm with high future productivity and low internal funds today will display a higher q. The reason for this is that the growth of its capital stock is constrained relative to expected productivity, and this raises the future marginal product of capital.
The paper focuses on the implications of the model for the correlation between investment, q and cash ‡ow. In particular, we show that a model with …nancial frictions can help to replicate the observed low correlation between q and investment, and the fact that cash ‡ow appears with a positive coe¢ cient in standard investment regressions. However, the model has a number of additional testable predictions on the response of investment and asset prices to di¤erent types of shocks (shocks with di¤erent persistence, shocks a¤ecting current/future productivity), as discussed in Section 3.5. As we noticed, recent models with market power and decreasing returns at the …rm level also display rich dynamics following shocks with di¤erent temporal patterns. Empirical work documenting the conditional behavior of investment and q following these shocks, would provide an important testing ground for both classes of models.
Throughout the paper, we have maintained Hayashi's (1982) assumption of constant returns to scale both in the production function and in adjustment costs. This has two advantages. First, it greatly simpli…es aggregation. Second, it allows us to focus on the "pure" e¤ect of the …nancial friction on investment regressions. Models with decreasing returns at the …rm level can produce deviations from q theory for independent reasons, so it is useful, at this stage, to separate those e¤ects from the e¤ects due to imperfections in …nancial contracts. At the same time, this choice leaves aside a number of interesting issues, which seem especially relevant when one introduces …rm-level heterogeneity, as we did in Section 4.
In the paper we have focused on the case of small stochastic deviations from the steady state. It is possible to extend the model to allow for "large" shocks, opening the door to potentially interesting phenomena. In particular, with large shocks it is possible to have a model where …rms hold precautionary reserves, i.e., choose to reduce investment today in order to buy …nancial securities as insurance against future shocks. This is another area where equilibrium behavior will be very sensitive to the time pro…le of the shocks hitting the …rm.
Finally, in the model we have assumed that consumers are risk-neutral. It turns out that the characterization result in Proposition 4 can be extended to economies with risk-averse consumers. Such an extension, which we leave to future work, would be useful to analyze the model's implications for the aggregate behavior of interest rates and risk-premia.
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the problem min
Suppose k o = (q o ) is optimal for a given q o and k 0 = 1. Constant returns to scale imply that, given (24) and the optimum is equal to (G ( (q
Therefore, we can set
completing the proof of the …rst part of the lemma. In a similar way, consider the problem
and suppose l = (w; q o ; A) is optimal for a given triple w; q o ; A and k = 1. Constant returns to scale imply that, given any k, l = (w; q o ; A) k is a solution to (25) and the optimum is
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 2
LetB be the space of bounded functions : X ! [1; 1). De…ne the map T :B !B as follows
Let us …rst check that T 2B if 2B, so the map is well de…ned. Notice that conditions (6)- (7) and E < C imply that
This implies that for any 2B we have
showing that T (X) 1. Assumption (8) implies that
so if (X) M for all X 2 X, then T (X) M= (1 ) for all X 2 X, completing the argument. Next, we show that T satis…es Blackwell's su¢ cient conditions for a contraction. The monotonicity of T is easily established. To check that it satis…es the discounting property notice that if
where the inequality follows from assumption (8) . Since T is a contraction a unique …xed point exists and (26) immediately shows that (X) > 1 for all X.
Proof of Proposition 3
Let be de…ned as in Lemma 2. We proceed by guessing and verifying that the value function is V (k; b; X) = (X) (R (X) k b). In the text, we have shown that, under this conjecture, the no-default condition can be rewritten in the form (3'). Therefore, we can rewrite problem (P ) as
where, in parenthesis, we report the Lagrange multiplier associated to each constraint. The multipliers of the no-default constraints are normalized by the probabilities ( 0 ). The …rst-order conditions for this problem are
where R 0 and 0 are shorthand for R (H (X; 0 )) and (H (X; 0 )). We want to show that the values for c E ; k 0 ; b 0 and b 0 L in the statement of the proposition are optimal. It is immediate to check that they satisfy the problem's constraints. To show that they are optimal we need to show that c = 1 > 0; k = 0; and ( 0 ) ; L ( 0 ) > 0 for all 0 . Setting k = 0 the second …rst-order condition gives us
] which, by construction, is equal to (X). Then we have c = (X) 1 > 0; which follows from Lemma 2,
which follows from condition (10), and
which follows from (X) > 1 and C > E . Substituting the optimal values in the objective function we obtain (X) (R (X) k b) con…rming our initial guess.
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is split in two steps. In the …rst step, we construct the steady-state equilibrium of the deterministic economy with a binding …nancial constraint, in the second, we construct an equilibrium of the stochastic economy. First, we derive a useful preliminary result. Applying the envelope theorem to problems (24) and (25) (see the proof of Lemma 1), using the fact that, in equilibrium, the ratio k o =k 0 is equal to K t =K t+1 , and the ratio l=k is equal to 1=K t , and using condition (16), we obtain the following expressions for q m t and R t :
Step 1. (Deterministic steady state) Consider a deterministic model where A t is constant and equal to 1 in each period (recall that 1 is the unconditional mean of the stochastic process for A t in the stochastic model). We will derive the steady state of this deterministic model under the assumption that the …nancial constraint is binding in equilibrium. Let the superscript SS denotes steady-state values. In steady state the equilibrium conditions (16) and (27) give q o;SS = 1 and q m;SS = 1. The law of motion for the capital stock (13) gives the steady-state condition
and (28) gives
Substituting (30) in (29) we obtain
and substituting back in (30) we get
By assumption, the model parameters are such that R SS < 1. A necessary and su¢ cient 27 condition for this is that the model's parameters satisfy
Then, the following two inequalities also hold
To prove these inequalities, notice that there cannot be a steady state with a binding …nancial constraint and K SS = 0. Otherwise, R SS would go to in…nity, violating E R SS < 1. So K SS must be strictly positive. Then, rearranging equation (29), it follows that
which implies both inequalities in (34) . The inequality R SS < 1 and the two inequalities in (34) correspond to conditions (6)- (8) in Proposition 3. Condition (10) holds immediately, given that E < C . This con…rms that the entrepreneurs'optimal behavior is consistent with (13) (and (29)). For completeness, we can use the recursive de…nition (9) to derive the steady state value of (X)
Rearranging this equation con…rms that SS > 1.
Step 2. (Stability) Substituting (15), (28) and the lagged version of (14) into (13), we obtain the following second-order stochastic di¤erence equation for K t Provided that
it is possible to show that the steady state derived in Step 1 is saddle-path stable. Then, given su¢ ciently small shocks we can construct a stochastic steady state where K t varies in a neighborhood of K SS . This gives us an ergodic distribution for the state vector X, with bounded support. We can then establish the continuity of the function with respect to the parameters X and show that (X) is bounded in [ ; ]. Since (6)- (8) hold in the deterministic steady state, a continuity argument shows that they hold in the stochastic steady state. Finally, A A can be set so as to ensure that the bounds for (X) satisfy
This guarantees that condition (10) is also satis…ed.
Notice that, by the arguments given, conditions (33) and ( 
The no-default constraints have been expressed as linear constraints, proceeding as we did in Proposition 3. Now the marginal value of entrepreneurial wealth, , is a function of the individual productivity A and we have Under these conditions the optimal individual policy can be derived as in Proposition 3, and we obtain the following law of motion for the individual capital stock
A newborn entrepreneur has initial wealth wl E . Putting together these conditions, the distribution and the law of motion (A; 0 ), allows us to completely characterize the joint dynamics of k and A. Then, under appropriate assumptions, we obtain an ergodic joint distribution J (A; k) and check that the wage rate w is consistent with the market clearing condition
where (A) is the optimal labor to capital ratio for a …rm with productivity A. Proceeding as in subsection 2.5, we can de…ne the …nancial value of a continuing …rm j: p j;t = j;t (R j;t k j;t b j;t ) + b j;t d j;t :
Substitute for d j;t , using the budget constraint d j;t = R j;t k j;t k j;t+1 , and the law of motion for the capital stock
(R j;t k j;t b j;t ) ; to obtain p j;t = j;t + C E [R j;t+1 jA j;t ] 1 C E [R j;t+1 jA j;t ] (R j;t k j;t b j;t ) :
Dividing both sides by k j;t+1 and using the recursive property of j;t gives the following expression for averagej;t = E (1 ) E + (1 ) j;t+1 R j;t+1 jA j;t + C E [R j;t+1 jA j;t ] :
For the investment rate notice that IK j;t = 1 k j;t
(1 ) R j;t 1 C E [R j;t+1 jA j;t ] k j;t k j;t ;
which gives the expression in the text. For cash ‡ow notice that A j;t F (k j;t ; l j;t ) wl j;t = R j;t k j;t q o k j;t .
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